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TAGS : PINT, PFOR, AF
SUBJ : REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN: PROSECUTE

SUMMARY: BASED ON WHAT WE KNEW PREVIOUSLY OF PRESIDENT DAUD, HIS COUNTRY, HIS INITIAL POLICY SPEECH JULY 17, AMBASSADOR NEIMANN'S DISCUSSIONS WITH DAUD AND PRINCE NAIM, AND SKETCHY INFORMATION OBTAINED SINCE JULY 17 COUP, EMBASSY OFFERS FOLLOWING ANALYSIS OF TAKEOVER, ASSESSMENT OF NEW REGIME'S PROSPECTS AND TENTATIVE RECOMMENDATIONS DEC POLICY: (1) COUP WAS EXECUTED BY SMALL NUMBER MOSTLY JUNIOR MILITARY OFFICERS (NOW BEING MOVED INTO POSITIONS OF AUTHORITY IN MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT), APPARENTLY IN DEFT SOVIET KNOWLEDGE OR CONNIVANCE; (2) MEMBERS OF GOVERNMENT TO DATE TOP-LEVEL CIVILIAN APPOINTMENTS INDICATE LIKELIHOOD THAT TIMING OF COUP WAS MOVED UP EITHER BECAUSE KING UNEXPECTEDLY LEFT COUNTRY

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PARTIAL TRANSCRIPTION - ORIGINAL FOLLOWS

IN JULY (RATHER THAN USUAL SEPTEMBER ABSENCE) OR TO
FORESTALL ANOTHER PLANNED COUP (3) INTERNAL POLITICAL
INSTABILITY MAY WELL BECOME HALLMARK OF COUNTRY IN FUTURE,
JUST AS STABILITY WAS FOR LONG STAGNANT, INEFFICIENT DEPOSED
REGIME;

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IN JULY (BASED ON USUAL SITUATIONS ACCORDING TO FORESIGHT AND OTHER
PLANNED ONE: (1) INTERNAL POLITICAL INSTABILITY MAY BE A
HALLMARK OF COUNTRY IN FUTURE, JUST AS STABILITY WAS FOR LONG STAN-
DANT, INEFFICIENT DEPOSED REGIME; (4) THERE IS AS YET NO JUSTIFICA-
TION FOR ASSUMING USSR WILL HAVE GREATER INFLUENCE IN REPUBLICAN
AFGHANISTAN THAN IT DID UNDER MONARCHICAL REGIME; (5) AFGHANISTAN'S
NEIGHBORS, IRAN AND PAKISTAN, COULD DO NO GREATER DISSERVICE THAN
TO FRUSTRATE JOINT PLANS OR ACTION COORDINABLE AS AIMED AGAINST
AFGHANISTAN; AND (6) USSR SHOULD CONTINUE TO HAVE STRONG PRESENCE
IN AFGHANISTAN AS MODERATING INFLUENCE ON HEADSTRONG LEADERSHIP,
USING ECONOMIC AID AS INCENTIVE TO ACHIEVE PRIMARY US GOALS,
ESPECIALLY INCLUDING ENCOURAGEMENT MODERATE REGIME, REGIONAL STA-
BILITY, AND EARLY AFGHAN COOPERATION ON NARCOTICS CONTROL. END
SUMMARY

1. IT NOW CLEAR THAT JULY 17 COUP WAS EXECUTED BY SMALL NUMBER
JUNIOR OFFICERS, PERHAPS BY AS FEW AS 15 LIEUTENANTS AND CAPTAINS
AND 300 OR FEWER ORDINARY SOLDIERS. INDICATIONS ARE THAT NEW
REGIME'S LEADERSHIP, FAR FROM HAVING PRECONCEIVED PROGRAM OF
ACTION, HAD CONCENTRATED UNTIL JULY 17 SOLELY ON SEIZURE OF POWER.
NEW GOVERNMENT MADE STRONG INITIAL EFFORT TO PRESENT POSTURE OF
CONFIDENCE, VITALITY AND HUMANITARIAN DIRECTION, BUT THESE WERE
PRIMARILY COSMETIC DESIGNED TO ASSURE A SHOCKED POPULACE AND TO
GAIN DIPLOMATIC RECOGNITION FROM WORLD.

2. EFFORT TO BRING ESSENTIAL GOVERNMENT SERVICES (COMMUNICATIONS,
POLICE, TRAVEL) HAVE BEEN REPORTED TO BE IN FULL AND CONTINUATION

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PARTIAL TRANSCRIPTION - ORIGINAL FOLLOWS

OF POSITIVE ACTIVITIES PREVIOUS REGIME IS UNDERGOING
NOTICEABLE SLOWDOWN. OBVIOUS LACK OF POSTCOUP PLANNING
PERHAPS EXPLAINABLE SIMPLY BECAUSE PLOTTERS DID NOT EXPECT
TO SUCCEED EASILY;

WE KNOW FOR CERTAIN IS [ILLEG] ASSERTION OF NEW LEADERS,
BOTH

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OF POSITIVE ACTIVITIES PREVIOUS RECTOR IS INTERESTING NOTICEABLE
SLOWDOWN, OBVIOUS LACK OF POSTCOUP PLANNING PERHAPS EXPLAINABLE
SIMPLY BECAUSE PLOTTERS DID NOT EXPECT TO SUCCEED SO EASILY;
HOWEVER, IT ALSO LIKELY THAT (AS DATT HAS REPORTED IN 6-800-0155-
73 OF JULY 25) COUP PLANNERS HAD TO MOVE THING UP EITHER (1)
BECAUSE KING LEFT COUNTRY EARLIER THAN NORMAL (JULY INSTEAD OF
SEPTEMBER) OR (2) THERE WAS ANOTHER COUP PLANNED (ABDUL WALI AND/OR
MOUSSA SHAFIQ?) AND DAUD'S FORCES MOVED FIRST.

3. NEW REGIME'S LEADERSHIP IN CENTRAL COMMITTEE HAS NATURAL
DIVISION ALONG GENERATIONAL LINES. INFORMATION NOW BEGINNING TO
EMERGE ON IDENTITIES OF YOUNGER MILITARY OFFICERS ON COMMITTEE
BUT LITTLE IS KNOWN OF THEIR ATTITUDES AND RELATIONSHIPS WITH
DAUD AND HIS "OLD GUARD." APPARENTLY PRESIDENT DAUD IS MOVING AS
QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE TO PLACE THEM IN POSITIONS OF AUTHORITY IN
HISTORY
MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT, BUT IF HISTORY OF MILITARY COUPS ANY
GUIDE, ONCE ARMY ENTERS POLITICS, IT RELUCTANT TO RETURN FULL
CONTROL TO CIVILIANS. WE THEREFORE REMAIN UNEASY ABOUT DAUD'S
ABILITY EVEN IN SHORT RUN TO PERSUADE ARMY TO RETURN TO BARRACKS.

4. THERE IS STILL NO SET-NO INFORMATION TO SUPPORT SPECULATION
THAT SOVIETS EITHER HAD FOREKNOWLEDGE OR ASSISTED IN COUP ONCE IT
BECAME KNOWN. RAPID RECOGNITION NOW BEING BY USSR EXPLAINABLE
BY NATURAL DESIRE FOR NEW REGIMEN TO GET OFF ON RIGHT FOOT
WITH COUNTRY IN WHICH IT HAS SUBSTANTIAL GEOGRAPHICAL INTEREST AND
SIZEABLE ECONOMIC TIES, LARGER THAN THAT OF ANY OTHER POWER. ALL
WE KNOW FOR CERTAIN IS DYNAMIC ASSERTION OF NEW LEADERS, BOTH

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PARTIAL TRANSCRIPTION - ORIGINAL FOLLOWS

DAUD AND NAIM, WHICH US ACCEPT FOR TIME BEING, THAT THERE
WAS NO RPT NO SOVIET INVOLVEMENT (NAIM QUOTED SOVIET
AMBASSADOR PUZANOV AS SAYING TO DAUD THAT "EVEN I DID NOT
KNOW THIS WAS COMING").

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DAUD AND NAJIB. WHICH WE ACCEPT FOR THE MOMENT. THAT THERE WAS NO
WPT NO SOVIET INVOLVEMENT (DAUD QUOTED SOVIET AMBASSADOR FUZAROV
AS SAYING TO DAUD THAT "EVEN I DID NOT KNOW THIS WAS GOING").

ALSO, JUNIOR OFFICERS PROMINENT IN COUP HAVE BEEN HEARD TO SOME-
FULLY DISMISS ANY RUSSIAN PART. WHETHER THAT IS ACTUALLY TRUE WE
MAY NEVER KNOW.

5. WE ARE INCLINED TO ACCEPT AT FACE VALUE DAUD'S AND NAJIB'S
ASSERTIONS THAT THEY ARE INDEPENDENT NATIONALISTS AND DO NOT AND
WILL NOT FOLLOW RUSSIAN OR ANYBODY ELSE'S ORDERS. BUT REAL
QUESTION IS WHETHER THEIR OWN POLICIES PLAY INTO RUSSIAN HANDS,
WHETHER THEY WANT THEM TO OR NOT, THUS BECOMING DESTABILIZING TO
THE REGION. PRIOR TO COUP, EMBASSY GENERALLY ACCEPTED THESIS THAT
SOVIETS HAD COME TO ACCEPT NON-ALIGNED AFGHAN POSTURE AS COM-
PATIBLE WITH LONG-TERM SOVIET INTERESTS, WHICH CALLED FOR RELATIVE-
LY STABLE (ALBEIT BACKWARD) NEIGHBOR WHICH WOULD DO NOTHING TO
DISTURB TRANQUILITY OF REGION OR GROWING USSR ECONOMIC AND
POLITICAL TIES IN THE SUBCONTINENT, AT EXPENSE, AT LEAST IMPLICITLY
IF NOT EXPLICITLY, OF CHINA. WHETHER SOVIET OBJECTIVES HAVE BEEN
OTHERWISE, OR HAVE CHANGED, WE CANNOT YET DETERMINE. THERE IS NOT
YET ANY DEMONSTRABLE EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT CLAIM THAT SOVIETS WILL
HAVE EASIER TIME WITH REFORMIST, AUTHORITARIAN, REPUBLICAN AND
POTENTIALLY UNSTABLE REGIME THAN IT HAD WITH STAGNANT, INEFFICIENT
BUT RELATIVELY STABLE AND PREDICTABLE PREDECESSOR GOVERNMENT.

6. FUTURE AFGHAN RELATIONS WITH PAKISTAN WILL BE SHAPED BY
SPECIFIC POLICY PRINCIPLES AND ACTIONS OF NEW GOVERNMENT.

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PARTIAL TRANSCRIPTION - ORIGINAL FOLLOWS

7. NEW REGIME HAS SAID NOTHING ABOUT RELATIONS WITH IRAN.

DAUD

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PRESIDENT DAUD HAS BEEN QUESTIONED CLOSELY BY AMBASSADOR NEUMANN AND DIPLOMATIC COLLEAGUES IN KABUL, AS WELL AS BY FOREIGN JOURNALISTS ON HIS REFERENCE IN JULY 17 SPEECH TO PAKISTAN. DAUD HAS REMAINED VAGUE AS TO HOW HE WISHES TO "SETTLE" ISSUE WHICH PAKISTAN CONSIDERS ARTIFICIALLY ENGENDERED, MEDDLESOME AND PROFITLESS TO PURSUE. SOME OBSERVERS HERE BELIEVE HIS RE PUBLIC REFERENCE TO PAKISTAN WAS MADE TO ATTRACT SUPPORT OF SUPERNATIONALISTS FOR REPUBLICAN REGIME IN EARLY DAYS, WHILE OTHERS BELIEVE PREVIOUS REGIME'S FAILURE TO TAKE ACTION ON PAKISTAN DURING "GOLDEN OPPORTUNITIES" OF 1965 AND 1971 WAS ONE PRIMARY MOTIVATION FOR STAGING COUP. DAUD HAS ALWAYS BEEN POPULAR AMONG "PAKISTANIS"; BUT UNLIKE PREDECESSOR GOVERNMENTS UNDER DEMOCRATIC EXPERIMENT (WHO KEPT ISSUE ALIVE PURELY FOR DOMESTIC POLITICAL PROPAGANDA PURPOSES), HE MAY BE EXPECTED TO DO SOMETHING MORE. THERE IS NO DOUBT THAT DAUD WAS DEEPLY HURT BY BEING FORCED TO RETREAT ON PAKISTAN POLICY IN PAST WHEN CLOSURE OF PAK BORDER INFLECTED GREAT HARM ON AFGHANISTAN. THAT THIS CONTRIBUTED TO HIS DOWNFALL IN MAY 1963 MAY GIVE RISE TO DESIRE FOR "ANOTHER ROUND"; YET, ONE SHOULD NOT ASSUME THAT A MAN WITH INTELLIGENCE OF DAUD SHOULD HAVE LEARNED NOTHING IN TEN YEARS OF BROODING EXILE FROM POWER. THIS WE WILL HAVE TO WAIT AND SEE. OTHER THINGS BEING EQUAL, CONTINUED STRONG US PRESENCE HERE CAN BE USEFUL TO MAKE WEIGHT FELT ON DAUD SHOULD HE TURN ON PAKISTAN IN TOO MILITANT A MANNER.

NEW REGIME HAS SAID NOTHING ABOUT RELATIONS WITH IRAN. DAUD

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Classification

PARTIAL TRANSCRIPTION - ORIGINAL FOLLOWS

HAS SAID PUBLICLY HE WOULD DO NOTHING ABOUT [2 WORDS ILLEG]
TREATY WITH IRAN (SIGNED BY PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT AND RATIFIED
BY PARLIAMENT, BUT NOT BY KING) UNTIL HE HAS HAD CHANCE TO
STUDY IT (KABUL 5492).

HAS SAID PUBLICLY HE WOULD DO NOTHING ABOUT HELMANS WATERS TREATY WITH IRAN (SIGNED BY PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT AND RATIFIED BY PARLIAMENT, EX BUT NOT BY KING) UNTIL HE HAS HAD CHANCE TO STUDY IT (KABUL 5492). OBSERVERS HERE SPECULATE HE WILL THINK TWICE BEFORE REJECTING IT; WE ARE INCLINED TO AGREE, ESPECIALLY SINCE IT HAS OBVIOUS ECONOMIC BENEFITS FOR COUNTRY. DAUD CAN BE EXPECTED TO RESPOND TO IRANIAN FEARS ABOUT HIS ALLEGED PRO-SOVIET INCLINATIONS WITH GREAT IRRITATION. AFGHANS HAVE ALWAYS RESENTED SHAH'S PATERNALISTIC PROFESSIONS OF CONCERN OVER UNDUE SOVIET INFLUENCE IN AFGHAN AFFAIRS; THEY FEEL IRANIAN CONCERN IS NOT ONLY TOTALLY UNJUSTIFIED BUT IS SMOKESCREEN FOR OWN DESIRE TO MEDDLE IN COUNTRY'S INTERNAL AFFAIRS. RECENT IMPROVEMENT IN PAK-IRANIAN RELATIONS IS LIKELY TO BE VIEWED HERE AS EFFORT TO SECURE FURTHER IRANIAN HEGETONY IN REGION. WE THEREFORE CONCLUDE THAT, EVEN THOUGH AFGHANISTAN MAY HAVE MORE TO LOSE THAN IRAN OR PAKISTAN IF RELATIONS DETERIORATE WITH EITHER NEIGHBORING POWER, IRAN'S FEAR OF AFGHANISTAN FALLING INTO SOVIET ORBIT COULD TURN INTO SELF-FULFILLING PROPHECY IF TWO POWERS TOOK ANY JOINT ACTION THAT COULD BE CONSTRUED AS AIMED AGAINST AFGHANISTAN.

8. OUTLOOK FOR U.S. RELATIONS WITH NEW REGIME WILL, OF COURSE, BE COLORED BY GOVERNMENT'S ABILITY TO CONSOLIDATE POWER AND TO FOCUS DECISIVELY ON PERSONNEL APPOINTMENTS, GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATION AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT POLICY. ON STRICTLY BILATERAL BASIS, THERE IS NO REASON WHY US-AFGHAN RELATIONS CANNOT BE AS GOOD (OR

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EVER BETTER THAN THEY HAVE BEEN IN THE PAST. IF NEW LEADERSHIP REALLY MEANS THEY WISH TO BE NEUTRAL AND INDEPENDENT, THEIR DESIRE FOR SIGNIFICANT AMERICAN PRESENCE SHOULD INCREASE AS SUSPICION OF MOSCOW THE LINGERS. ON DOMESTIC GROUNDS, TOO, A SIGNIFICANT AMERICAN PRESENCE SHOULD BE IMPORTANT TO THE AFGHANS. THERE WAS OBVIOUSLY NO ENTHUSIASM FOR WEAK AND VACILLATING MONARCHY, BUT BY NO STRETCH OF IMAGINATION CAN ONE DETECT ANY ENTHUSIASM FOR DAUD; THERE IS RESPECT, PROBABLY FEAR, BUT CERTAINLY NO LOVE. HENCE NEW REGIME WILL HAVE TO PERFORM FAIRLY QUICKLY AND IN WAYS WHICH SHOW EARLY SIGNS OF IMPROVEMENT FOR COMMON PEOPLE. NAIN'S REMARKS TO AMBASSADOR (KABUL 5325) CLEARLY INDICATE THAT NEW GOVERNMENT IS KEENLY AWARE OF THIS PROBLEM. HERE, TOO, US ASSISTANCE WOULD SEEM TO BE IMPORTANT, NOT ONLY FOR ITS SIZE BUT PERHAPS EVEN MORE FOR THE CHARACTER OF OUR TECHNICAL AND MANAGERIAL ADVICE WHICH THE AFGHANS FIND MORE PERTINENT AND DISINTERESTED THAN THAT WHICH COMES FROM OTHER SOURCES. NOW THAT THE ARMY (ESPECIALLY THE YOUNGER OFFICERS) HAVE ENTERED POLITICAL ARENA, FUTURE COUPS ARE DISTINCT POSSIBILITY IF DAUD DOES NOT PRODUCE RESULTS MORE QUICKLY THAN HAS BEEN EVIDENT THIS FAR.

9. IF THESE INITIAL ASSUMPTIONS PROVE CORRECT -- AND WE SHALL HAVE TO OBSERVE PATIENTLY FOR A WHILE -- THE U.S. HAS IMPORTANT CARDS TO PLAY. IF DAUD GOVERNMENT SOON PROVES TO BE MORE DECISIVE AND EFFECTIVE IN THE ECONOMIC SPHERE THAN MOST OF GOVERNMENTS OF PAST TEN YEARS (A REAL POSSIBILITY), US ASSISTANCE CAN BECOME EVEN MORE IMPORTANT TO AFGHANISTAN THAN IN THE PAST. IF, THEN, DAUD

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PARTIAL TRANSCRIPTION - ORIGINAL FOLLOWS

WERE TO ENGAGE IN POLICIES TOWARDS HIS [2 WORDS ILLEG] WHICH
WE REGARD AS POTENTIALLY DESTABILIZING AND INIMICAL TO OUR
INTERESTS, THE POSSIBILITY OF WITHDRAWAL US ASSISTANCE COULD
SERVE AS SOMEWHAT OF A DETERRENT, IF SUBTLY BUT FIRMLY
PLAYED.

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WENT TO REGAIN IN POLICIES. IT IS OUR VIEW THAT SUCH A POLICY, WHICH IS
REGARD AS POTENTIALLY DOWNGRADING OUR INTEREST IN THE REGION.
THE POSSIBILITY OF WITHDRAWAL OF ASSISTANCE COULD SERVE AS SOME
WHAT OF A DETERRENT, IF SUBTLY BUT FIRMLY PLAYED. OUR INTEREST
IN SECURING EARLY AND EFFECTIVE AFGHAN COOPERATION ON IMMIGRATION
CONTROL MEASURES CAN ALSO BE SERVED BY USING ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE
CARROT TACTICS. POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS IN OUR AID EFFORTS, THERE-
FORE, REMAIN IMPORTANT, AS IN THE PAST.

10. UNTIL SHAPE OF THINGS TO COME EMERGES MORE CLEARLY, WE SHOULD
CONTINUE WITH BUSINESS AS USUAL AND LISTEN WITH SYMPATHY AND
INTEREST TO NEW PROPOSALS. OUR ACTIONS WILL OF COURSE DEPEND ON
THE NATURE OF AFGHANISTAN'S ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL DIRECTION AS IT
EMERGES. AT SAME TIME WE SHOULD COUNSEL AGAINST ALARMIST TALK
AND ACTION IN IRAN AND PAKISTAN -- HOWEVER UNDERSTANDABLE AND
POTENTIALLY JUSTIFIABLE. AT THIS TIME BOTH STYLE AND ACTION ARE
EQUALLY IMPORTANT.

NEWMAN



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